L.S. Penrose's limit theorem: proof of some special cases by Lindner, I. & Machover, M.
L.S. Penrose's limit theorem: proof of some special 
cases  
Ines Lindnera and Moshé Machover , , b 
a University of Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany b CPNSS LSE, London NW6 6EN, UK  
 
Received 1 December 2002;   
revised 1 April 2003;   
accepted 1 May 2003. ;  
Available online 8 July 2003.  
 
Abstract 
L.S. Penrose was the first to propose a measure of voting power (which later came to 
be known as ‘the [absolute] Banzhaf (Bz) index’). His limit theorem—which is implicit 
in his booklet (1952) and for which he gave no rigorous proof—says that in simple 
weighted voting games (WVGs), if the number of voters increases indefinitely while 
the quota is pegged at half the total weight, then—under certain conditions—the ratio 
between the voting powers (as measured by him) of any two voters converges to the 
ratio between their weights. We conjecture that the theorem holds, under rather 
general conditions, for large classes of variously defined WVGs, other values of the 
quota, and other measures of voting power. We provide proofs for some special 
cases. 
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1. Introduction 
In his [Penrose, 1946] paper, Lionel Penrose gave the first definition of a priori voting 
power. According to this definition, as slightly amended in his [Penrose, 1952] booklet 
the voting power of voter a equals the probability ψa of a ‘being able to influence a 
decision either way’. Here it is assumed a priori that all voters other than a vote 
independently of one another, each voting ‘yes’ and ‘no’ with equal probability; so 
that all divisions of those voters into ‘yes’ and ‘no’ camps are equiprobable. Then ψa 
is the probability of the event that those voters are so divided that a's vote will tip the 
balance: if a votes ‘yes’ the act in question will be adopted, and if she/he votes ‘no’ 
the act will be blocked.1 
Penrose always assumes that decisions are subject to the simple majority rule, 
whereby each voter must vote either ‘yes’ or ‘no’ (so that no abstentions are 
admitted) and a proposed bill is adopted iff it receives over half of all votes. However, 
he allows the formation of blocs, so that a bloc-voter can have any positive integral 
number of votes. Thus the decision rules he considers are a special case of what is 
known in the voting-power literature as a ‘weighted voting game’ (WVG). 
Let us recall briefly the definition of a WVG. A WVG consists of a finite set N of 
voters together with an assignment of a non-negative real weight wx to each voter x
N, and a real q (0, 1). A bill is passed under iff the coalition (set of voters) A 
voting for it satisfies the condition: 
(1) 
 
We refer to N as the assembly of and to q as the latter's relative quota. The whole 
right-hand side of (1), namely q multiplied by the total weight of N, is the absolute 
quota, or simply the quota.  
Penrose confines his attention to the special case in which q equals or slightly 
exceeds (1/2)., 2 For such WVGs, he derives in (1952) the following approximation for 
the voting power ψa of voter a: 
(2) 
 
In deriving (2) he assumes that the number of voters is large, and wa is small 
compared with the sum S of all weights., 3 Note that as wa/S becomes vanishingly 
small, so do both sides of (2). Thus ≈ must be taken to mean that the relative error of 
the approximation tends to 0; in other words, the ratio between the two sides tends to 
1.  
Implicit in this approximation formula is a limit theorem about the behaviour of the 
ratio between the voting powers of any two voters, a and b: if the number of voters 
increases indefinitely, while existing voters always keep their old weights and the 
relative quota is pegged at 1/2, then (under suitable conditions): 
(3) 
 
Penrose does not present a rigorous proof of (2) and (3), but merely outlines an 
argument, which is presumably based on some version of the central limit theorem of 
probability theory.  
Unfortunately, (2) or (3) do not always hold under the conditions assumed by 
Penrose. For example, let 0<w′<w, and for any positive integer n put: 
(4) 
 
Thus, voters 2, …, n+1 have the same weight, which is greater than that of voter 1; 
and a bill is adopted iff it receives at least (and hence in fact more than) half the total 
weight., 4 Clearly, for any fixed n the voting powers ψi[  (n)], for i=2, …, n+1, are 
positive and equal to one another. But: 
(5) 
 
Hence (3) does not hold in this case for a=1 and b>1.  
Nevertheless, experience suggests that such counter-examples are atypical, 
contrived exceptions. Both real-life and randomly generated WVGs with many voters 
provide much empirical evidence that (3) holds in most cases, as a general rule: if the 
distribution of weights is not too skewed (in other words, the ratio of the largest 
weight to the smallest is not very high), then the relative powers of the voters tend to 
approximate closely to their respective relative weights. Moreover, this is the case not 
only for multi-voter WVGs with q=1/2, but also for those with any q (0, 1). 
By the relative power of voter a in a WVG we mean here a's Banzhaf (briefly, Bz) 
index β, obtained by normalising (or relativising) the Penrose measure: 
(6) 
 
Similarly, a's relative weight in is obtained by dividing a's weight by the total 
weight of all voters: 
(7) 
 
The typical tendency of the values of β to approximate to the respective relative 
weights in multi-voter WVGs is illustrated in Table 1 and Table 2. The WVGs shown 
in these tables are taken from [Felsenthal and Machover, 2001]. Both are decision 
rules designed for the so-called qualified majority voting (QMV) in the EU's Council of 
Ministers following its prospective enlargement to 27 member states. 27 (Table 1) 
is prescribed in the [Treaty of Nice, 2001]; , 5 Rule B (Table 2) is a ‘benchmark’ rule 
proposed in [Felsenthal and Machover, 2001].  
 
Table 1. QMV under 27 
 
Full-size table (<1K) 
Quota: 1034=74.66% of 1385. Note: For explanations see main text. 
 
Table 2. Rule B (benchmark QMV rule for enlarged CM) 
 
Full-size table (<1K) 
Quota: 6000=59.99% of 10 002. Note: For explanations see main text. 
In each of these tables, column (1) gives the weights of the voters. The absolute and 
relative quota are stated at the bottom of the table. Column (2) gives the respective 
relative weights as percentages. Column (3) gives the relative voting powers as 
measured by the Bz index β, also in percentage terms. Column (4) gives the ratio of 
the Bz index to the respective relative weight. Note that all the figures in this column 
are quite close to 1. In Table 1 they are well within the range 1±0.1. In Table 2—
where the quota is nearer half the total weight—the approximation is even better: the 
ratios are all well within the range 1±0.01. 
The same tendency is also apparent in Table 3, which is based on a WVG model of 
the Electoral College that elects the President of the US. The figures for β are quite 
close to those for . 
 Table 3. US Presidential Electoral College (1970 Census) 
 
Full-size table (<1K) 
Quota: 270=50.19% of 538. Note: For the purpose of this table, the Electoral College 
is regarded as a WVG, in which each ‘voter’ is a bloc of Electors for a State, or for the 
District of Columbia. The number of Electors in each bloc is taken as the weight w of 
this bloc-voter. The first column, headed ‘Number’ shows the number of blocs with a 
given weight w. This way of modelling the Electoral College involves some over-
simplification, because there may be more than two candidates, and since 1969 the 
Electors of Maine did not have to vote as a single bloc. (Since 1993, the same 
applies to Nebraska). We use this model here for the sake of computational 
illustration, and for comparison with Table XII.4.1 of [Owen, 1995], (p. 297), which is 
based on the same model. For further explanations, see Remark 3.5. 
Moreover, a similar phenomenon is observable not only for the Bz index, but for also 
for some other indices of voting power, notably the Shapley–Shubik (briefly, S–S) 
index φ., 6 This typical behaviour of φ is also illustrated in Table 1 and Table 2. In 
these tables, column (5) gives the values of the S–S index φ in percentage terms and 
column (6) gives the ratio of these values to the respective relative weights. Note that 
all these ratios are well within the range 1±0.05. The same tendency is evident also 
in Table 3: compare the figures for φ with those for . 
This suggests a general problem: under what conditions does the ratio of the voting 
powers of any two voters, as measured by a given index, converge to the ratio of 
their weights? 
In order to make this problem more precise, let us introduce the following framework. 
 
Definition 1.1.  Let 
(8) 
N(0) N(1) N(2) … 
be an infinite increasing chain of finite non-empty sets, and let 
(9) 
 
  Let w be a function that assigns to each a N a positive real number wa as weight; 
and let q be a real (0, 1).  For each n  let (n) be the WVG whose assembly is 
N(n)—each voter a N(n) being endowed with the pre-assigned weight wa—and whose 
relative quota is q.  We shall then say that {  (n)}n=0∞ is a q-chain of WVGs.  Further, 
let ξ be an index of voting power. We shall say that Penrose’s Limit Theorem (PLT) 
holds for the q-chain {  (n)}n=0∞ with respect to the index ξ if for any a, b N 
(10) 
 
 
 
Remark 1.2.    
(i)In what follows, whenever we shall refer to a q-chain {  (n)}n=0∞, we shall assume 
that the N(n), N and w are as specified in Definition 1.1: N(n) is the assembly of (n), 
N is given by (9), and w is the weight function.  
(ii)Note that ξa[  (n)]/ξb[  (n)] in (10) is undefined if a N(n) or b N(n), but this does 
not matter because a, b N(n) for all sufficiently large n.  
(iii)Definition 1.1 may be extended to weighted ternary voting games, in which voters 
have the option of abstaining—cf. [Felsenthal and Machover, 1997 and Felsenthal 
and Machover, 1998]. The only change that needs to be made to the definition is that 
each (n), instead of being a (binary) WVG, is the ternary decision rule whereby a 
bill is passed iff the total weight of those voting for it is at least q times the total weight 
of those voting against it. Of course, ξ must then be an index defined for such games. 
In preparation for what follows, we introduce two items of notation. 
First, note that if a N(n) the relative weight of a in (n)—unlike a's absolute weight 
wa—depends on n. We denote this relative weight by ; thus: 
(11) 
 
Second, for each a N we put: 
(12) 
Na(n) { x N(n) : wx=wa }. 
The members of Na(n) have the same weight as a, and we shall therefore refer to 
them as replicas of a.  
2. PLT for replicative q-chains and the S–S index 
In this section, we shall prove that PLT holds with respect to the S–S index for a 
special class of chains. The main special property of these chains is that each a N 
is eventually (that is, for sufficiently large n) accompanied by sufficiently many 
replicas in Nn. Let us make this more precise. 
 
Definition 2.1.  We shall say that the q-chain {  (n)}n=0∞ is replicative if it satisfies the 
following two conditions. First, 
(13) 
 
Second, for each a N there is a positive constant Ca such that for all sufficiently 
large n 
(14) 
 
 
 
Remark 2.2.  Condition (13) is essentially the one assumed by Penrose: the relative 
weight of each individual voter becomes negligibly small. This condition is 
automatically satisfied if the values of w are bounded from above and bounded away 
from 0.  The second condition (14) ensures that nevertheless, the total relative weight 
of the voter's replicas does not become negligibly small.  
Our main result in this section is 
 
Theorem 2.3.  If is a replicative q-chain then PLT holds for it with respect to 
the S–S index φ. 
 
Proof.  We shall show that for each a N 
(15) 
 
from which our theorem clearly follows.  To this end, we invoke a result of [Neyman, 
1982], Theorem 9.8), according to which (13) implies that: 
(16) 
 
Now let a N. Then we have, a fortiori, 
(17) 
 
which can be written as: 
(18) 
 
However, all the x Na(n) are replicas of a, so they all have the same value of φ and 
the same weight as a. Hence (18) can be written as follows: 
(19) 
 
It now follows from (14) that (15) holds—as claimed. □ 
 
Remark 2.4.  In the definition of WVG, the blunt inequality ≥ in (1) can be replaced by 
a sharp inequality>. The two definitions are equivalent: they determine the same 
class of structures. However, the relative quota q of a WVG in the blunt sense may 
not work for the sharp sense, but may need to be slightly adjusted (and vice versa). 
Consequently, the corresponding definitions of q-chain and replicative q-chain in the 
sharp sense do not yield the same classes as our present Definition 1.1 and 
Definition 2.1Definition 1.1 and Definition 2.1. Nevertheless, Theorem 2.3 applies to 
replicative q-chains in the sharp sense as well, because Neyman's result, on which 
our proof depends, also covers this case—see [Neyman, 1981], Lemma 3.2).  
3. PLT for some 1/2-chains and the Banzhaf index 
Given a q-chain {  (n)}n=0∞ of WVGs (see Definition 1.1), we associate with it the 
family {  x : x N } of independent random variables indexed by N, such that for 
every a N, 
(20) 
 
We consider the chain 
(21) 
 
of (finite) sets of these random variables.  
For any a N let us put: 
(22) 
 And let be the ‘standardised’ form of S¬a(n), i.e. 
(23) 
 
Using the definition of the a it is easy to obtain the following explicit expressions for 
μ¬a(n) and σ¬a(n). 
(24) 
 
 
(25) 
 
 
 
Definition 3.1.  We shall say that the chain satisfies the special local central limit 
(SLCL) condition if, for every a N, 
(26) 
 
and for all a, b N, 
(27) 
 
 
 
Remark 3.2.  The are evidently discrete random variables with mean 0. We shall 
be interested in cases where their standard deviations, σ¬a(n), tend to ∞ with n. Then 
Eq. (26) says that the average density of in a half-open interval around 0, whose 
length becomes vanishingly small, approaches the value of the standard normal 
density function at 0, namely . This means that obeys a special case 
(namely, at 0) of the local central limit theorem of probability theory.  
The main result in this section is 
 
Proposition 3.3.  Let be a 1/2-chain of WVGs. If its associated chain 
satisfies the SLCL condition, then PLT holds for with respect to the Bz 
index. 
 
Proof.  Let a N and take n large enough so that a N(n). Then, by definition, the 
Penrose power of a in (n) is given by: 
(28) 
 
Using (23) and (24), this can be re-written as: 
(29) 
 
Invoking (26) we obtain 
(30) 
 
Hence by (27) 
(31) 
 
Finally, using (6) we get: 
(32) 
 
as claimed. □  
Combining (30) and (25) we get: 
 
Corollary 3.4.  If (26) holds, then 
(33) 
 
  This is our slightly improved version of Penrose's approximation formula (2). Of 
course, if—as Penrose assumes—each individual weight wa becomes relatively 
negligible, then the difference between the two approximations is likewise 
negligible. □ 
 
Remark 3.5.  [Owen, 1995], pp. 272, 297) gives approximation formulas for ψ as well 
as for φ in multi-voter WVGs. His approximations are based on an interval version of 
the central limit theorem (as opposed to the local form used by us), and are stated 
without proof and without specifying the precise conditions under which they hold., 7 
Nevertheless, the numerical approximations he obtains for the Penrose powers φ of 
the bloc-voters in the US Presidential Electoral College—shown in the last column of 
Table XII.4.1 of [Owen, 1995], p. 297)—are closer than ours, which are based on (33) 
above and shown in the last column of our Table 3. (The exact values of ψ, correct to 
six decimal figures, are shown in the penultimate column of Table 3).  
As an example of an application of Proposition 3.3, we prove the following: 
 
Theorem 3.6.  Let be a 1/2-chain such that its weight function w assumes 
only finitely many values, all of them positive integers; and such that the greatest 
common divisor of those values wa that occur infinitely often is 1. Then the 
associated chain satisfies the SLCL condition. Hence PLT holds for with 
respect to the Bz index. Also, (33) holds. 
 
Proof.  To prove that (26) holds for any a N, observe that since all possible values 
of ¬a(n) are integers, all possible values of belong to a lattice whose span is 
1/σ¬a(n). In the half-open interval: 
(34) 
 there are exactly wa points of this lattice: say xi(n), i=1, 2, …, wa.  We now invoke a 
well-known version of the local central limit theorem—see [Petrov, 1975], p. 189, 
Theorem 2). , 8 From this theorem it follows that if n is sufficiently large then for each 
i=1, 2, …, wa the product: 
(35) 
 
is arbitrarily close to (xi(n)). Also, from (25) it is clear that limn→∞ σ¬a(n)=∞; thus for 
sufficiently large n each of the xi(n) is arbitrarily close to 0, hence the product (35) is 
arbitrarily close to (0)=(2π)−1/2. But the left-hand side of (26) is simply the arithmetic 
mean of the wa products (35); so it also gets arbitrarily close to (2π)−1/2, as 
required.  As for (27): we have just seen that as n increases, σ¬a(n) grows without 
bound. Clearly, the term wa 2 in (25) becomes relatively negligible. Therefore, (27) 
holds. □ 
 
Remark 3.7.  Note that the chain defined in our counter-example (4) fails to satisfy 
the condition of Theorem 3.6, even if the weights w and w′ in (4) are integers. In this 
case, only the greater weight, w, occurs infinitely often, and so it is trivially also the 
gcd of the weights that occur infinitely often; but w>1.  
4. Discussion 
PLT may best be regarded not as a single theorem but—like the central limit theorem 
of probability theory, with which it has some affinity—as an open-ended research 
programme covering many related results. Our present results are merely a modest 
contribution to this programme. 
On the basis of empirical-computational evidence, we conjecture that similar results 
hold for other classes of q-chains (including those of suitably defined weighted 
games that admit abstentions) with respect to the –  , Bz as well as other indices of 
voting power. 
In fact, it seems to us likely that PLT holds almost always, in a sense that can be 
made precise, along the following lines. 
Let + be the set of positive integers and consider the Cartesian product space: 
(36) 
 
Each member of is then an infinite sequence of the form (q; w0, w1, …) where q
(0, 1) and the wn are positive integers. Such a sequence gives rise to a q-chain {  
(n)}n=0∞, where N(n)={0, 1, …, n} for each n  .  
Further, we can regard as a product probability space by taking (0, 1) with the 
Lebesgue probability measure, and each copy of + with a reasonable probability 
distribution: say a geometric distribution (Prob{k}=2−k), or a Poisson distribution 
(Prob{k}=e−1/(k−1)!). 
Or, instead of confining ourselves to integer weights, we can allow arbitrary positive 
real weights. To this end we can replace + by the set + of positive reals, with some 
reasonable probability measure on each copy—using, say, a Gaussian density f on 
the positive half-line: 
(37) 
 
It now makes precise sense to talk about the probability that PLT holds, with respect 
to a given index, for the chain corresponding to a randomly chosen member of . 
We conjecture that PLT holds with probability 1 with respect to both the –  and the 
Bz index. 
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(1946) took ψa/2 rather than ψa itself as a's voting power; the difference is of course 
inessential. Penrose's measure ψ is often referred to in the literature as ‘the 
[absolute] Banzhaf index’ and denoted by ‘β′’. In using ‘ψ’ we are following [Owen, 
1995]. 
2 In fact, he seems to be thinking of (1) with> instead of ≥, and q=1/2. We shall return 
to this minor point below; see Remark 2.4 (ii). 
3 In stating (2) and the assumptions under which it is derived, we are paraphrasing 
Penrose. For his own formulations see his (1952, p. 715). 
4 For the square bracket notation see, for example, [Felsenthal and Machover, 1998], 
Definition 2.3.14). 
5 27 is not stated in the treaty in this simple form, as a WVG; but it can be reduced 
to the form shown in Table 1. For details, see [Felsenthal and Machover, 2001], 
Section 3). 
6 Thus, in multi-voter WVGs in which the distribution of weights is not extremely 
skewed, the respective values of β and φ tend, as a general rule, to be quite close to 
each other. This phenomenon has helped to foster the widespread fallacy that these 
two indices always behave alike, and so must have more or less the same meaning. 
This fallacy is criticised in [Felsenthal and Machover, 1998]. 
7 Rigorous validation of these approximations is not straightforward. In cases where 
the approximation is expected to hold, both the relative voting power of each voter 
and the term approximating it tend to 0 as the number of voters increases. In order to 
validate the approximation, it must be proved not only that the error term—the 
difference between the true value and the approximating term—also tends to 0, but 
that it does so faster than the approximating term. 
8 This theorem deals with a sequence of independent integer-valued random 
variables each having finite variance, such that the set of distinct distributions of 
these variables is finite. The key condition is that the greatest common divisor of the 
maximal spans of those distributions that occur infinitely often in the sequence is 1. 
For details see [Petrov, 1975], ibid). 
 
